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Introduction
International Air Law and International Space Law are applicable in the region above 
the earth. International Air Law applies to aircraft in the air space and flying aircraft are 
regulated by the sovereignty of a country. International Space Law is intended to apply to 
objects in outer space, and space objects are free from the sovereignty of a country. The 
boundary between the air space and the outer space is generally understood to be the 
lowest possible earth orbit. 
A ballistic missile is a weapon that is launched from a ground (or sea) base, flies 
through outer space, and strikes in an opponent’s territory. Thus, a ballistic missile is 
neither an aircraft nor a space object. It follows that the development and utilization of 
ballistic missiles is not banned under general international law. 
Space development and utilization is closely related to the development of ballistic 
missile technology. During the Cold War, the intercontinental ballistic missile 
technologies developed by both the United States of America and the Soviet Union - the 
major space powers - promoted the military utilization of earth orbits.  
There is no International Law that restricts development of nuclear weapons except the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. If a country is not a contracting party to the Treaty that country 
is free to develop nuclear weapons. The Missile Technology Transport Regime (MTCR) 
restricts the transfer of missile technology, but again, if a country is not a signatory, 
that country is free to transfer and/or receive missile technology. Therefore missile 
development cannot be restricted under a general international law.
The High-Level Panel of the United Nations 2 submitted a report concerning “a Global 
Threat to the Security and the Reform of an International System” to the United Nations 
soon after the United Nations Millennium Summit in December, 2004. The Report of the 
Panel noted that there were six clusters of threats with which the world needed to be 
concerned with in the immediate future and in the decades ahead. These were: economic 
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and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; 
inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-
scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism, and 
transnational organized crime 3.
Today, the most serious challenge to a threatened country is how to defend against 
nuclear ballistic missile attack. As there seems to be no fully effective ground-based 
missile defense system, various types of military satellites seem to be inevitable in the 
future. The deployment of military satellites is not prohibited under the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1966. The purpose of this article is to review the issues surrounding the military 
utilization of earth orbits and the related space laws.
1  Cold War and Space Utilization
The Cold War proceeded along with the competition in the development of strategic 
missile technology between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The 
development of rocket engine technology and missile guidance was indispensable to 
the corresponding technology of satellite launch and control. Both countries competed 
vigorously. As military super powers they had similar viewpoints that leadership in space 
technology development was linked to political and military superiority.  
This space technology development competition between the two super powers started 
when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1 into earth orbit in 1957. There were a series of 
keen competitions over the launching of a manned satellite, the first space walk, and the 
attainment of moon orbit. These culminated with the Apollo 11 Mission of the United State 
which achieved the first soft landing on the surface of the Moon and returned to the earth 
safely in 1969. 
During the space technology development competition, both countries gradually 
recognized that it would be impossible to defend from a nuclear strategic missile attack. 
They then concluded Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in 1972 and the Anti-
ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in the same year. Subsequently, both countries adopted a 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy 4, and the world entered into détente era.
The 1970’s was the decade in which many nations star ted space technology 
development, and when full scale commercial utilization of space began. Hackneyed 
militar y satellite technology was transferred to commercial space technology and 
commercial utilization of earth orbits has progressed rapidly since then. The U.S. Space 
Shuttle program debuted in 1970’s. The International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (INTELSAT) was established in 1973 and the International Maritime 
Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) followed in 1979. 
During the 1980’s, the détente between the U.S. and the USSR continued and expanded 
to include direct cooperation as illustrated by the space rendezvous project. The advanced 
earth observation satellite - LANDSAT - was launched in the détente era. The Strategic 
Defense Initiatives (SDI)5 that the U.S. had advocated in 1983 and 1985 were started at 
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the laboratory level; SDI played an important role in the ending of the Cold War. During 
the same period many countries created domestic legislation aimed at stimulating their 
independent space development programs.
2  COUPUOUS and drafting the Outer Space Treaty
The launch of Sputnik I made the world recognize the necessity for the international 
regulation of the use of space. In 1958, The United Nations established the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), with the mandate to examine legal issues 
concerning the peaceful uses of outer space. 
There were arguments whether “peaceful uses” meant “non-military uses” particularly 
since it was the military sectors of both space super powers who were driving the 
development of space technology. Neither countr y welcomed a discussion of the 
prohibition of the military uses of outer space at the legal sub-committee in the COPUOS. 
Both countries had common interests in securing freedom for “military uses” of outer 
space.
During arguments on the interpretation of “peaceful uses”, the Soviet Union initially 
insisted that within the emerging legislative framework, the term “peaceful” should 
include “non-military” and that military applications should be prohibited in outer space. 
The Soviet Union also insisted that “peaceful uses” of outer space were closely related to 
disarmament, and that the two should be considered together.  
The U.S., on the other hand, insisted that military utilization of outer space should be 
judged in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international laws, 
and should not be judged by the terminology of “military” or “non-military”. The U.S. also 
argued that military utilization of outer space should correspond to the purpose of the 
United Nations and military utilization should not be prohibited. In other words, the U.S. 
insisted that the term of “peaceful” should be contrasted with the term “aggressive”, and 
“peaceful uses” should be interpreted to mean “non-aggressive uses”. 
The Soviet Union ultimately modified its viewpoint and accepted the interpretation 
proposed by the United States, agreeing that the issues of disarmament and the 
militarization of space could be tackled separately and that the terms “peaceful uses” and 
“non-military uses” should not be seen as being synonymous. As a consequence the term 
“peaceful uses” now tends to be interpreted as “non-military uses” and the term “non-
military” is used to mean complete exclusion of military objectives or character. Most 
other nation - with the notable exception of Japan - have accepted this interpretation. 6
The COPUOS decided that the issue of the aggressive military uses of outer space 
should be handled in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)7, and 
decided to focus exclusively on the issues of the peaceful uses of outer space. The U.S. 
and the Soviet Union then jointly proposed a compromise draft of the Outer Space Treaty 
to the legal sub-committee of COPUOS.
The COPUOS adopted the draft and submitted it to the United Nations General 
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Assembly, and the Outer Space Treaty 8 was adopted in December, 1966. The Treaty 
is called a Space Constitution because humankind’s space activity will be regulated 
according to various principles provided in the Treaty. After the Treaty came into effect, 
four space laws 9 were subsequently legislated in accordance with the Treaty.   
Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty is said to be a disarmament clause, however, it does 
not have rigid provisions on military utilizations in the earth orbit. Article 4 provides that 
the non-military uses of outer space are limited to “moon and other celestial bodies”, 
because military uses of outer space were concentrated in the earth orbit. Both the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union succeeded in getting a free hand for the military utilization of earth 
orbits, while agreeing to the compromise of a complete restriction on military use of “the 
moon and other celestial bodies”.  
3  Military Satellites in Earth Orbit
The U.S. and the Soviet Union have developed various types of practical military 
satellites based upon technical knowledge that was acquired during the space technology 
development competition. As mentioned above, both countries have concentrated on and 
developed earth orbit, military satellites because military satellites are indispensable for a 
modern army to operate effectively in both wartime and peacetime. 
Satellites with military purposes are classified into two groups; the first includes passive 
support systems such as reconnaissance satellites, communications satellites, weather 
satellites, and earth observation satellites; the other classification encompasses active 
weapon systems such as hunter-killer satellites. 
Military earth observation satellites are classified into five categories according to their 
purpose such as a photoreconnaissance satellites, electronic intelligence satellites, ocean 
surveillance satellites, early-warning satellites, and nuclear explosion detection satellites. 
Military electronic intelligence satellites were developed to collect electromagnetic 
wave information from certain military headquarters on the earth and are indispensable 
to modern warfare. The military sector continuously gathers important information 
such as electronic warfare support, electronic countermeasures, and electronic counter 
countermeasures by means of intelligence satellites. They have become essential to the 
effective operations of modern military forces in wartime. 
Military communications satellites and military navigation satellites are indispensable 
for super powers to operate their military forces deployed globally; the former are used 
for command, control and communication among military forces deployed worldwide, 
and the latter are used for acquiring exact target position of an enemy’s ground troops, 
military vessels and aircraft. Military weather satellites enable military meteorological 
observations in various parts of the earth. 
Military geodetic satellites were developed to model the exact shape of the earth and 
its gravitational field as well as the topology characteristics of the oceans. These military 
satellites are used for taking pictures of an enemy’s military assets and for bombarding 
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targets. 
Military Early-Warning Satellites detect a missile launch using infrared receptors that 
sense the boost heat of ballistic missiles. These satellites also detect the missile launching 
base, the precise position of the missile along its trajectory, the exact reentry time and 
the intended impact area - transmitting the appropriate alert signals in real time. This type 
of satellite is crucially important as an element of any missile defense system. A nuclear 
explosion detection satellite was developed to detect violations of the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963.
There are two types of active missile attack weapon systems: one is called a hunter-
killer satellite which approaches and collides with a target satellite in earth orbit 10, and the 
other is an anti-satellite missile that is launched from the surface of the earth or from a 
high-flying interceptor aircraft. 
4  The Ballistic Missile Defense System of the United States.
With the advent of the Cold War, the U.S. developed a triad of nuclear weapons systems. 
This included intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), manned strategic bombers (SB) 
and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). 
As noted above, the U.S. and the Soviet Union concluded two treaties - The Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty in 1972 and The Anti-Ballistic Missile Limitation Agreement 
in 1972 - to avoid the terrifying prospect of accidental nuclear warfare. They both 
subsequently adopted a new nuclear strategy known as Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD).
President Ronald Reagan of the U.S. was suspicious about the MAD strategy and 
proposed a new nuclear strategy - The Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI) - in 1983. 
President Reagan’s strategy envisioned the interception of ever y launched ICBM 
before it reached the U.S. homeland. The Soviet Union, understandably, objected to the 
development of SDI technology. After prolonged negotiations, both countries agreed 
to study SDI elements at the laboratory level. The Soviet Union, however, gave up the 
technological development of SDI; this “capitulation” subsequently became one of the 
contributing factors to the end of the Cold War in 1989.
President George H. W. Bush (the Elder) announced a new nuclear strategy of Global 
Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) soon after the end of the Cold War. GPALS 
was a defensive strategy against a limited nuclear missile attack. Bush’s successor, 
President William Clinton promulgated two nuclear strategies; the National Missile 
Defense (NMD) to defend the U.S. homeland from ICBM attack, and Theater Missile 
Defense (TMD) to defend allies from the theater ballistic missile (TBM) strikes. Finally, 
in May, 2001, President George W. Bush (the Younger) integrated NMD and TMD into 
Missile Defense (MD).
The MD system developed by the U.S. is a multilayered missile defense system. It will 
protect against intruding nuclear ballistic missiles with the Airborne Laser (ABL) 11 and 
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Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)12 in the boost stage, the Naval Standard Missile (SM-3)13 
in the midcourse stage, and the THAAD 14 missile and the advanced capability Patriot 
Missile (PAC-3)15 in the terminal stage. 
5  Ballistic Missile Defense System of Japan
North Korea launched the first Taepo-Dong I missile in August 1998. The missile flew 
over Japanese territory and fell into the Pacific Ocean. North Korea explained the event as 
the failure of a satellite launching 16. This incident raised arguments for the reexamination 
the Japan’s interpretation of the concept of “peaceful uses” of space. 
Ballistic missiles that North Korea has developed include the Scud B with a range of 
300km and the Scud C with a range of 500km; these are believed to be targeted at South 
Korea, The No-Dong Missiles with a range of 1300km can reach Japan, and Taepo-Dong 
I with a range of 1500km could reach Australia. It is believed that these ballistic missiles 
are already operationally deployed. In addition, North Korea is thought to be developing 
a Taepo-Dong II with a range of more than 5,000 km that could be targeted at the United 
States. 
Were North Korea to launch a No-Dong against Japan, the missile would separate 
from its booster within 2 minutes. The reentry vehicle with nuclear warhead would reach 
its highest altitude of approximately 200 km, and reenter the atmosphere at a speed of 
around 3km per second. Baldly stated, a North Korean ballistic missile could strike the 
territory of Japan within 10 to 15 minutes of launch.
Japan has had to respond to the rapid change in the security environment of the 
Northeast Asia region. Therefore, the Japanese Government decided to adopt a security 
policy based on BMD in December, 2003. The Government argued that because Japan’s
BMD system was purely defensive, it was not in contradiction to Japan’s traditional 
“peaceful uses” interpretation, 
Japan’s BMD is composed of command and control elements, battle management 
elements, telecommunication system elements and the sensor systems for detecting 
and pursuing intruding missiles. The BMD will be able to synchronize effectively two 
different defensive missiles such as an advanced capability Patriot Missile (PAC-3) from 
a land base and a standard missile (SM-3) from a sea-based Aegis 17 system , In other 
words, Japan’s BMD system will be expected to intercept a North Korean TBM with a 
combination of SM-3s in the upper tier at altitudes of 90km in the midcourse phase and 
PAC-3 in the lower tier at altitudes of 15km of the terminal trajectory.
Conclusion
The competition in space development between the United States and the Soviet Union 
and the military utilization of earth orbits were examined above. Since the military sectors 
of the two space super powers were engaged in the development of space and missile 
technology, the Outer Space Treaty admits launching military satellites for peaceful 
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purposes into earth orbits.  
The development of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads is not restricted in 
general international law. It is necessary for every threatened country to be able to 
intercept nuclear ballistic missiles before damage occurs, because the destructive power 
of a nuclear weapon is enormous. Space powers except Japan have concentrated on 
developing various types of practical military satellites, and some of them are utilized as 
elements of a Ballistic Missile Defense system.
Japan has several problems relating to the implementation of an effective BMD system. 
Ballistic missile information from an early warning satellite is indispensable to the 
interception of nuclear ballistic missiles. However, Japan cannot legally deploy an early 
warning satellite for detecting North Korean ballistic missile launches, because Japan 
still maintains the interpretation of “peaceful uses” as meaning “non-military uses”, even 
though an early warning satellite is assumed to be “non-aggressive use” in general by the 
rest of the international space community.
If Japan’s interpretation of “peaceful uses” is not to be changed, Japan must obtain the 
necessary information of a threatening ballistic missile launch from the early warning 
satellites of the United States. Whether or not the U.S. would actually provide that data 
in a timely fashion - in the midst of Japan’s crisis - is uncertain. It is not surprising that 
thoughtful Japanese citizens worry about the reliable operation of the country’s BMD  
system 18.
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